Listening to the Experiences of Japanese Business Persons Resident in the United States in the Early High-yen Period of the 1970s through the 1990s by 川島 正樹 & SATO Ikuo
Center Activities and Miscellaneous News in 2012
After finishing successfully beyond our original expectation the five-year
project of hosting the NASSSS (Nagoya American Studies Summer Seminars,
2007-2011), at the start of the school year of 2012, from April 2012 to March
2013, the Center for American Studies made an overall plan for our annual
academic activities. In the first annual Center Research-Staff meeting held on
June 6, we decided to start several new projects. On the following pages, we
would like to make public two sets of these events among others. The first event
was providing an opportunity for the students and the local public to listen to the
experiences of the our Eibei (the Department of British and American Studies)
OB/G’s in the United States, especially in the early age of Japanese companies’
participation in the U.S. market and society over 1970 through 1990. The second
event is Japanese acceptance of American popular culture. As the initial part of
this event, we focused on two amateur bands who have played bluegrass music
for three or four decades in the Tokai area.
KAWASHIMA Masaki, Director of the Center for American Studies
1. Listening to the Experiences of Japanese Business
Persons Resident in the United States in the Early
High-yen Period of the 1970s through the 1990s
(1) Introduction
KAWASHIMA Masaki
On the afternoon of October 24, from 15:15 to 17:00, the center invited two
Eibei (the Department of British and American Studies) OB’s, Mr. SATO Ikuo
and Mr. ASANO Tadao, who graduated in the spring of 1970 just before the
“Nixon Shock.” Both lived in the United States from the 1970s through the
1990s, in the period of an increasingly strong yen. This prompted Japanese
manufacturing companies to establish subsidiary corporations to sell their
products directly in the United States. Among the first resident business persons,
there were not a few of our graduates including Mr. Sato and Mr. Asano. Both of
them have now retired from local companies in the Tokai area. Mr. Sato was
working for a leading subsidiary company in the auto industry and Mr. Asano was
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working for a renowned stationary producer. While pursuing each company’s
goal of making as much profit as possible, they tried to assimilate into the local
communities in the United States during the age of “Japan Bashing.” The center
would like not only to give a rare opportunity for students and the local public
alike to find a way out of “the lost decades” of Japan’s economy, but also to leave
records of their precious historical testimony about real cultural exchanges by
ordinary people between Japan and the United States. The following are the
contributions by the two above-mentioned eyewitnesses.
(2) A Brief History of the Japanese Car Industry as Seen from the
Standpoint of Car Exports to the U.S.: How Japan Started Car Exports
to the U.S. in the 1960s and then Shifted to Local Production in the U.S.
SATO Ikuo
Preface
After graduating from Nanzan University in 1970, I went into the automotive
business. I obtained a job at the Sales Department of Aisan Industry Co., Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as Aisan),
1
one of the major automotive component
suppliers in Japan.
Aisan was originally established in Nagoya as a subsidiary of Toyoda
Automatic Loom Works Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Toyoda) for ordnance
manufacturing in 1938 on the eve of World War II. However, when the war
finally ended, it could not produce these items anymore. It had to go through
very difficult and chaotic times in order to find a new line of business to survive.
Aisan was lucky, for somehow it could manage to find a way to manufacture and
supply automotive components to Toyota Motor Manufacturing Co., Ltd.,
(hereinafter referred to as Toyota) another subsidiary of Toyoda.
TOYODA Kiichiro, the son of TOYODA Sakichi who founded Toyoda, had
been crazy about starting his new business. His father developed automatic
looms and led Toyoda to become one of the major producers of automatic looms
in the world. So he wanted to make something new on his own, and make it into
a well distinguished business in the world, too. He seemed to have a long-term
perspective and saw a great future for automobiles. Although there was
opposition within the company to his new venture, he started Toyota as a
subsidiary of Toyoda before the war. He wanted to produce passenger cars;
however, the war forced him to concentrate on the production of trucks instead of
passenger cars. Toyota therefore produced more trucks than passenger cars during
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Aisan is located at 1-1, Kyowa-Cho, Obu-City, Aichi-Prefecture, 474-8588 Japan with
overall consolidated sales of 149.9 billion Japanese yen in fiscal 2011 and a workforce of
8,400 employees worldwide.
the war. The coming of peace changed the environment completely and
encouraged him to start the production of passenger cars again. But the initial
production levels were still nothing to speak of.
After World War II
It is not well known that automobiles require quite a number of, and wide
variety of, components. For example, it is said that a new car, introduced to the
market nowadays, is made of approximately 20,000 to 30,000 components
depending on the model. And car manufacturing companies are able to produce
only 20 to 30 percent of all the required components themselves. Other
components such as, glass, sheet metal, plastic, mechanical and electronic
components, have to be sourced from other manufacturers. In other words, car
manufacturing is not be possible without automotive component suppliers and
material producers.
It was really lucky for Aisan to be able to restructure its line of business from
ordnance to automotive components after the WW II. Thanks to its close equity
connection with Toyoda,
2
it could succeed in securing the business to produce
automotive components, such as carburetors and fuel pumps for Toyota. Thus
Aisan managed to survive the difficult post-war period.
Though the production situation for cars and trucks in Japan had been quite
bleak right after the war, the situation changed overnight. When the Korean War
broke out in 1950, unexpected war demand for automobiles and components
helped Japanese auto manufactures to solidly establish their business base and
expand their operations. At the same time, the domestic automobile market was
beginning to gradually develop along with the expansion of the Japanese
economy in general. This made it possible for car manufacturers to further
concentrate their efforts on the development and production of new automobiles.
In the early 1950s, Toyota sent one young engineer, TOYODA Eiji, a nephew
of TOYODA Kiichiro, to the U.S. to see and study what high-volume automobile
manufacturing was like. Fortunately he was warmly received by Ford Motor
Company and Ford kindly permitted him to study various production processes at
its River Rouge Complex in Dearborn, Michigan. Before he was sent to Ford, he
firmly believed that Toyota was an automobile manufacturer. However, the total
amount of production from the inception of the company had not yet reached
5,000 vehicles, while Ford at that time produced more than 8,000 vehicles per
day. He was astonished to see this difference and their production processes at
work. He had to admit that Toyota was not qualified to be listed as a world-class
automobile manufacturer. Studying energetically, he decided to someday make
Toyota one of the leading car manufacturing companies. Ford did not know what
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As of April, 2012, Toyoda owns approximately 9% of Aisan’s outstanding stock, while
Toyota owns 33%.
the young engineer from the war-torn far-eastern country had dreamed about and,
surely, never thought that the small company, for which he worked, would
become one of its most formidable competitors afterward.
One of the directors of Aisan in the 1980s, who had long worked as a general
manager in the production department at one of Toyota’s plants and later joined
Aisan as a director of manufacturing
3
, told me an interesting anecdote to describe
the engineering level of cars produced in the 1950s. In those days, they did not
even know that the brake timing for the rear brake system of the vehicle should be
slightly delayed. Otherwise, when the driver presses the brake pedal to stop the
car, its power is transmitted through the hydraulic system to the brakes on each
wheel at one time. Then the car suddenly loses control, and in the worst case, can
be overturned. In the case of a bicycle, wise riders learn this fact through their
experience and instinctively delay pulling the rear brake. Toyota did not realize
this until its vehicles overturned several times on the road and it became quite a
serious issue. Wondering why, they disassembled American vehicles, checked
their braking systems and finally found a special valve installed in the hydraulic
system, which enabled this timing delay. This episode showed eloquently that
cars made in the early 1950s were far from the dependable and reliable level
necessary for everyday use.
Early Years of Car Exports to the U.S.
As was the case for other Japanese industries in the 1950s, demand from the
domestic market was not sufficiently large enough for real growth of the
automotive industries. The domestic market, which was closely protected from
foreign competition by strict import regulations imposed by Japan’s conservative
government, was surely lucrative, but still quite small. They needed overseas
markets for further expansion. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the most prosperous
market in the world was, by far, the U.S. market. So it was quite natural for
Japanese car manufacturers to try to participate in the U.S. automotive market. In
the beginning, they did not realize at all that U.S. customer demand for car
performance, quality and price level was extremely high. By the late 1950s,
Toyota had already overcome the performance and quality related problems
mentioned above and set out to export its cars to the U.S. market.
Here they had to confront other difficulties. They had to learn about the fact
that U.S. customers’ demand was much higher than that of Japan. They had
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Transfer of personnel happens quite often between Toyota and its suppliers. In most cases,
Toyota employees, capable enough in the area in which they specialize but not regarded as
future directors, are sometimes recommended to leave Toyota at an earlier than normal
retirement age and move to component suppliers as directors where they can exercise their
expertise. This is normally regarded as quite beneficial to all the parties concerned: Toyota,
suppliers and the individuals involved.
already built up some kind of confidence in their cars by offering newly designed
cars in the domestic market which were welcomed warmly by Japanese
customers. This led them to make serious errors. They thought quite carelessly
that cars marketed in Japan, with some minor changes to meet some U.S. traffic
laws and regulations, would be welcomed as they were in Japan. They began to
export some cars to the U.S. and started selling them in California. Initial
customer response was not so bad, for there were actually no small cars except the
Volkswagen and a few European cars at that time.
But soon they had claims from various customers saying Toyota cars would
not go at all on “Baker Hill”, which lies between Los Angeles and Las Vegas.
Baker Hill, at first look, is a long and seemingly flat road in the California desert,
but in fact, it is an uphill road with the grade toward Las Vegas lasting several
miles. Other cars, such as Chevrolet, Ford, Chrysler, and even the small
Volkswagen, kept going up this hill without any problems. But Toyota cars, due
to their insufficient radiator capacity, soon became overheated and their engines,
no matter how hard the driver pressed the accelerator pedal, died sheepishly on
the hot desert road. Suppose yourself that your car stalled suddenly on a desert
road under the relentless sun. This was no laughing matter, rather a matter of life
and death. These kinds of customer claims and responses gave precious lessons
to Toyota and other Japanese car manufacturers. And they learned them
surprisingly quickly. By the mid-1960s, they had gradually penetrated into the
U.S. market, though most of their sales were still limited to the West Coast
market. Nissan firmly established their name as a producer of small but
dependable pickup trucks under the Datsun brand and Toyota became known as a
producer of small cars with high quality.
Rapid Growth in the U.S. Market
By the early 1970s, small car and truck exports from Japan to the U.S. had
grown by leaps and bounds. U.S. car manufacturers, especially the Big Three,
traditionally offered only big cars to their customers. But the time was changing.
They failed to see the big demand from post-war baby boomers coming to age and
the rapid increase in urban residents. Those people did not consider big cars
made for persons with big families. Instead, they sought small but comfortable
cars for their first and second car needs. This new social phenomenon pushed up
the demand for small cars. But the Big Three could not satisfy these requirements
because they did not have real small cars at hand. What they believed to be small
cars were hastily introduced to the market; but, they were often still too big and
lacked the desired quality and performance. Along with the increase of the U.S.
export vehicles, so-called Motorization had occurred in Japan at almost same
time. Until the late 1960s, the car was not yet affordable for common people.
But rapid economic growth realized in the 1960s and the early 1970s made it an
item, still somewhat luxurious though, which middle or upper class people
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managed to buy. As mentioned before, I joined Aisan in the spring of 1970 and
my first monthly pay was 39,000 yen. And as a practice in those days, new
employees, including college graduates, were forced to experience various
manufacturing jobs at almost all automotive parts suppliers in Japan. Companies
said this was a part of their on-the-job training program. But, in fact, it was quite
apparent that this was implemented to help them meet the increasing demand for
both the domestic market and exports, that is, the U.S. market. I was placed on
the assembly line for carburetors, which were our major products at that time.
Work was quite simple and monotonous, but required accurate and speedy
operations. After a month or so, when I got accustomed to the work speed, I got
bored with my work. During those instances, which were probably only a matter
of one or two seconds at a time, I thought about how many months of work I
would need to buy a new car with my pay. The Corolla, which was the best-
selling car in Japan in the early 1970s, cost me approximately about 12 months of
salary with 40 hours of overtime. But during those 12 months, I needed to pay
for my food, clothes, transportation and other miscellaneous daily expenses.
Then it seemed to me that a new car was still a dream for the common man even
though he was engaged in the production of vital automotive components, but not
an impossible dream.
Aisan as a Leading Component Supplier and its Initial Exports
In the 1970s, thanks to its business with Toyota and other domestic car
manufacturers, Aisan became known as the largest carburetor supplier in Japan.
Its product line was diversified by adding engine valves and several other
components in the late 1960s. Engine valves were formerly produced at Toyota,
but their production, along with various production equipment, was transferred
from Toyota to Aisan when one of Toyota’s general managers was dispatched to
Aisan. It was believed that the engine valve business was a kind of bridal gift, for
this person became one of the senior directors at Aisan. Anyway, with the
production volume increase and the addition of new products, Aisan became quite
prosperous. Under these circumstances, Aisan started thinking about exporting its
products to the U.S. Probably the logic was quite simply this: “If a car made in
Japan can be sold well, why not automotive components?” Since the late 1960s,
Aisan sent one carburetor design engineer to Los Angeles, CA. He was stationed
in the Quality Assurance Department of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S. A., Inc., the
sales arm of Toyota. However, he worked with Toyota and was engaged in
resolving quality problems associated with carburetors and other Aisan products
in the field. He was not qualified to conduct any marketing studies, nor other
necessary sales activities, which would enable Aisan to export its products.
The Director of Sales at Aisan in the 1970s, who later climbed the ladder to
become president and then chairman, had a long range view for the export of its
products. So, in 1970, he hired a person able to do a study of the U.S. automotive
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market and the actual marketing of its products. I was hired to do that job. After
three years of training, which was mostly dedicated to the actual sales activities of
Toyota, I was sent to Chicago. In those days, many other first tier automotive
suppliers to Toyota and Nissan also wanted to take part in the huge U.S.
automotive market. But most of those suppliers could not afford to maintain their
own offices in the U.S. So, the Japan Automotive Parts Industries Association
(JAPIA), a trade organization composed of almost all Japanese automotive parts
manufacturers, set up an office in Chicago. Automotive suppliers who were
members of JAPIA and wished to have a sales and marketing person in the U.S.
could rent a small desk in that office. All the necessary administration and
secretarial work was handled by JAPIA. The person sent by the suppliers did not
need to worry about these things and could concentrate their time and effort on
the promotion of their products to be exported. It was a kind of “apartment
office” for automotive suppliers’ sales persons and administered by JAPIA.
Through the 1970s, the total number of sales persons sent by various suppliers in
Japan, was kept at its maximum capacity of 15 persons. Each person, who was a
representative of their respective company, started almost from scratch to develop
his business in the U.S. Even at that time, the automotive business was one of the
toughest businesses and their efforts were not easily rewarded. But they worked
hard and gradually secured their businesses. Their first business was normally in
the replacement parts market. Direct parts supply for the production needs of car
manufactures is called OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) and is
extremely difficult to obtain because of fierce competition among many huge and
long experienced parts suppliers. The same conditions existed for Japanese parts
suppliers at that time in the U.S.
The Appreciation of the Japanese Yen against the U.S. Dollar
The strong yen impacted all of Japan’ s export businesses. Aisan was no
exception. Though I was sent to this joint office run by JAPIA in 1973, the first
two or three years were mostly spent making studies and experimenting with
initial sales activities to provide replacement parts to suppliers, lawn mower and
other engine operated farm equipment manufacturers and one or two car
manufacturers at most. However, these activities were seriously set back by the
sudden appreciation of Japanese yen. In 1975, the yen, which had been fixed at
360 yen for one U.S. dollar after WW II, was floated, in order to better reflect the
actual strength of both currencies and balance the selling and buying situation in
the foreign currency market. With these unprecedented changes in post-war
history, the U.S. dollar plummeted against the yen and its related effects, which
were labeled together as the “doru-shock”, meaning dollar depreciation impact,
were quite extensive and serious for Japan. Especially it caused a devastating
impact on Japanese export industries in general.
In the late 1970s, the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese
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yen dropped below 200 yen per dollar. Goods produced in Japan lost one of their
most critical competitive edges, low cost, in the U.S. market in the blink of an
eye. However, Japanese car manufacturers and component suppliers, in other
words, the Japanese automotive industries as a whole, were not defeated by this
sudden appreciation of the currency. They soon started striking back, step-by-
step. It was not a dramatic recovery at all, but a gradual and inconspicuous one.
They concentrated their efforts in order to regain their competitiveness.
Interestingly enough, the Japanese did not resort to a simple but effective “price
cutting” strategy. They knew that price cutting, in order to maintain their hard-
gained market share in the U.S., would be effective only for a short period of time
and could not be kept up for a long time. They were afraid that it would not be
good for their long-run business. They wanted to have other countermeasures,
which would last for a long time and give better results. They strove to attain
overall cost cutting through quite a variety of approaches. They used
fundamental approaches, such as VA (Value Analysis), VE (Value Engineering),
and IE (Industrial Engineering) placing their emphasis on productivity
improvements. And these efforts were not limited to a group of engineers and
key personnel in charge, but they were conducted by almost all employees within
the organization. Even the assembly line workers contributed toward the goal by
vigorously participating in Kaizen (Improvement) activities directly associated
with their daily jobs. Generally, the companies encouraged employees to
contribute their unique ideas and suggestions. They rewarded employees with
payment of half of the savings expected to be attained by the implementation of
their ideas before they brought forth actual results. In these struggles,
productivity-oriented production systems, such as the now-legendary Toyota
Production System, the Just-In-Time System, the Kaizen movement and the TQC
(Total Quality Control System) were born and firmly took root in Japanese
automotive industries. These all-out efforts made it possible for Japanese car
manufacturers and parts suppliers to recover their competitive edge against the
rapid and continuous appreciation of yen.
At Aisan, almost identical activities to those mentioned above to regain its
competitive position were carried out. It was amid all these activities that the
initial export business to the U.S. started in 1976. It was the supply of
replacement carburetors and carburetor repair kits. Then it was followed by a
contract to supply motor cycle engine valves for the replacement market. Step-
by-step and year-by-year, market penetration was accelerated and the products
exported to the U.S. expanded to include automotive engine valves for
replacement use, engine speed governors and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
apparatus for industrial engines and so on. However, the overall export value as a
proportion of Aisan’s total sales amounted to only five per cent. In the meantime,
thanks to the sales increase of Taibei-Yushutsu (imports to the U.S.), components
required for cars and small trucks exported to the U.S. by car manufacturers,
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overall sales increased substantially. In the late 1970s, Japanese car companies
exported almost half of their production and cars exported to the U.S. accounted
for three-quarters of their total exports. This shows how important exports to the
U.S. were for Aisan, even though its direct export sales level was quite limited.
This was the case not only for Aisan, but also for other automotive parts suppliers
in general.
Through the 1960s, environmental concerns, which sought purer, safer air,
water and other environmental resources, were becoming common among many
people in the U.S. These issues motivated the American congress pass the Clean
Air Act in the early 1970s. This gave all car manufacturers quite difficult
technological challenges. They had to reduce toxic exhaust gas emissions from
the vehicles to the level required by the law; and, this target value was gradually
moved to result in cleaner air. In the beginning, it looked almost impossible.
Even though it was technically possible, it was believed that it would make the
car extra-ordinary expensive and that cars would no longer be available to
ordinary people. This new legal requirement for cars and small trucks, in a sense,
worked quite favorably for Japanese car manufacturers. Since the requirement
was for all car companies selling cars in the U.S., they were not exempted from
the law. It was a requirement for all car companies regardless of their nationality.
Neither U.S. nor Japanese car companies were exempted from this requirement.
They were all treated equal. Since this was a new technical regulation, every car
manufacturer had to start from scratch. The Big Three, though they were proud
to have a long experience in car production, had no advantages. Japanese car
manufacturers, whose history in car production was at most 30 years or so, were
placed on the same starting line in this race. Honda was probably one of the first
car companies to be able to meet this emission requirement. They developed the
“CVCC” engine which has a very unique air-fuel preparation design. Other car
manufacturers in Japan followed this trend with their own unique emission
regulation countermeasures. Of course, U.S. car companies did not end up empty
handed. They also came up with various countermeasures to meet the emission
requirements. However, their efforts were mostly dedicated to large cars and
engines, at which they were traditionally good. They did not look seriously at the
small car segment of the market. They did not have much room to take care of
small cars. So the small-car segment was left open to foreign car companies,
including the Japanese. It was probably the first time for U.S. car manufacturers
to understand the real potential of Japanese car producers. They realized that the
Japanese were good at not only making small cars, but also at making
technologically advanced, inexpensive small cars. Japanese car manufacturers
became real contenders in the U.S. automotive market.
The Japanese yen continued to appreciate against the U.S. dollar throughout
the 1970s and the 1980s. Though the exchange rate often fluctuated upward or
downward reflecting various economic factors, the long range trend was steadfast
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appreciation. In 1987, it dipped under 150 yen per U.S. dollar. This was less than
half of the exchange rate in 1973. Every time the yen hit a record-high exchange
rate, the Japanese automotive industry was shocked. But they did not get panic-
stricken. They had already accumulated experience with strengthening exchange
rates. They simply renewed and further tightened their now habitual efforts to
lower cost, increase productivity and enhance quality.
The Technology Struggle of Aisan
Aisan faced an extremely difficult transition in its product line during the
1980s. Their traditional major products, carburetors, were becoming an
endangered species in the automotive world with the introduction of electronic
fuel injection systems. Naturally aspirated internal combustion engines, such as
the gasoline engine on cars, were traditionally equipped with carburetors. But,
newly developed electronically controlled fuel injection systems were gradually
displacing carburetors from the market. Carburetors, which mix gasoline with air
to supply the fuel/air mixture to the engine, were a product of the mechanical age.
Now mechanical things have been replaced with the computer controlled
electronic products. At the initial stage, computers were expensive and were not
able to perform the functions performed by sophisticated mechanical systems.
However, through the development of highly capable integrated circuits and
related computer software, computer controlled automotive components drove out
mechanical components quite easily. Aisan had to restructure its product line
drastically in order to survive. During these struggles, it, just as other carburetor
manufacturers in the world did, tried to develop electro-mechanical carburetors,
which were a kind of hybrid between carburetors and computer-controlled fuel
injection systems. But the mass production of integrated circuits and further
development of computer software made these hybrids obsolete too.
Car companies, both in Japan and in the U.S., did not jump to the newly
developed fuel injection systems. Since they had been accustomed to mechanical
carburetors for such a long time, they were quite reluctant to switch over to the
new computer controlled systems, because the computer itself had not yet proved
to be reliable for use under demanding real-world conditions. They thought that
carburetors could survive if they added a simple computer with several sensors.
This idea was right in terms of technical feasibility. In 1980s, many car
companies introduced an electro-mechanical fuel metering system on their new
models. Ford Motor Company was one of them.
Through the 1970s, Aisan’s business in the U.S. was pure direct exports from
Japan. Customers placed an order to Aisan in Japan through its office in Chicago
and Aisan, in turn, exported their products to the customers. This business style
presented various problems for its customers. They had to make an import
declaration and handle customs clearance. Furthermore, they had to keep some
inventory on hand to continue their normal production runs because the time from
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placing an order to actually receiving products from Japan took nearly three
months. Most customers wanted their business relations with Aisan to be similar
to that of their long accustomed domestic suppliers. By doing so, they could
reduce the paperwork associated with the imports and reduce the necessity of
carrying large inventories themselves. To meet these requests from the
customers, Aisan established its first overseas sales company in Chicago in the
early 1980s. And it continued its sales promotion activities to the Big Three car
companies, while supplying replacement parts to the U.S. market. And finally its
long effort was rewarded.
In the late 1980s, Ford began switching over its fuel metering system from
carburetors to computer controlled fuel injection systems. But they thought that a
computer aided mechanical carburetor still could perform well enough on their
small trucks. In the mid-1980s, they conducted a special carburetor evaluation
program called the “World Best Carburetor” contest to confirm the capability of
the carbureted engine system for performance and emissions requirements. They
encouraged several leading carburetor producers in the U.S., Europe and Japan to
participate. Aisan was not included among those carburetor manufacturers at
first, but happened to be included in the project at the final stage. Careful
comparative studies in the laboratory and the field were conducted by Ford using
various carburetors from the leading carburetor manufacturers in the world. And,
due to its long experience as the largest carburetor manufacturer in Japan and its
well established automotive fuel metering systems calibration technologies, Aisan
was approved as the winner of the contest. Though Ford had, by that time,
decided to use computer controlled fuel injection system for its future passenger
cars, they nominated Aisan as the supplier of carburetor systems for its small
truck. Aisan started production of carburetors and other related components for
the Ford Ranger 2.0 liter truck from the 1988 model year. Ironically, Aisan’s
carburetor became the last carburetor installed on a Ford engine because Ford
completely changed over its fuel metering systems to computer controlled
systems thereafter. So Aisan’s name was surely remembered as the last
carburetor used by Ford. Thus, Aisan finally succeeded in its direct export
business to one of the Big Three car manufacturers. But this triumph was
destined to be short lived. With the increasing usage of computer controlled fuel
injection systems on cars and trucks, its carburetor business with Ford came to an
end in the early 1990s. In this time period, Aisan had to face another serious
issue regarding its business in the U.S.
Trade War
In the 1980s, car exports from Japan to the U.S. had to go through quite a
tough time. At the end of the decade, Japanese car companies had to switch from
the export of vehicles to production in the U.S. In the beginning of the 1980s, the
trade imbalance had become extremely unfair for the U.S. The trade surplus
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resulting from the export of cars and small trucks by Japan had become huge and
it was once even said that the trade deficit of the U.S. as a whole was caused only
by the import of Japanese cars. Japanese cars and small trucks had already
exceeded the critical line and their market share topped 30 percent. This
triggered a wide-spread counter-movement among various sectors in the U.S. At
first, the automotive industries reacted bitterly. Not only car manufacturers, but
also United Auto Workers at the Big Three and major automotive parts suppliers
insisted that Japanese car producers were dumping their cars on the U.S. market,
while poorly paying laborers in Japan. They also claimed that, with the recent
trend of the U.S. dollar/Japanese yen exchange rate going quite unfavorably
against the Japanese automotive business, they were selling their cars far cheaper
than the price level faced by consumers in Japan. Sometimes, these extremists
went too far by demonstrating their anger by publicly smashing Japanese cars into
pieces with a hammer. These incidents were easy enough to report in the
newspapers and on television. It prompted both the U.S. Congress and the
government to take corrective action against Japan, though it is theoretically a
matter of business competition. They demanded Japan not only to curb its car
exports to the U.S., but also to increase the import of U.S. goods and services to
offset the trade imbalance. It looked like a trade war raging between the two
countries. Faced with these demands from the U.S., the Japanese government, as
usual, yielded quite easily. It applied strong pressure on its car industries to
comply with these demands somehow. Under these strong pressures, the
Japanese automotive industries were forced to put “voluntary restrictions” on the
number of their vehicles exported to the U.S. market and to purchase both
vehicles and various automotive materials/components made in the U.S.
Furthermore, toward the end of the 1980s, labor unions, such as the UAW,
and some congressmen representing union workers demanded a much higher local
content for U.S. components and services on the vehicles sold in the U.S. This
was, of course, intended to secure work for their members and constituents. By
stipulating higher U.S. content for cars and trucks sold in the U.S., they could
expect Japanese car companies to reduce their exports of vehicles and, at the same
time, U.S. car companies not to use foreign made components in their vehicles.
Japanese car companies, though irritated, conscientiously responded to the
politically influenced demands of both the Japanese and the U.S. government, and
reduced their automobile exports to the U.S. But they did not reduce car exports
uniformly. What they did was to reduce the export of low end vehicles and
continued to export high end luxury models to the U.S. U.S. consumers did not
react as their government and the automotive industry desired. They did not
consider buying the big U.S. made vehicles, but flocked to the small but reliable
Japan-made small cars, even though they were more expensive than normally
available cars because of the grade change.
U.S. car exports to Japan did not succeed either. Forced by the Japanese
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government, some Japanese car companies directly imported U.S. made cars into
Japan from their counterparts. For example, Toyota imported from General
Motors and Mitsubishi from Chrysler. Since they knew quite well that U.S. cars
were not able to meet the demands of Japanese consumers if introduced to Japan
as they were, they negotiated with U.S. car manufacturers and jointly redesigned
export models to suit Japanese tastes and actual driving practices. However,
despite these various efforts, they did not sell well at all. They were usually too
big to park and handle on Japanese roads and were excessively gas-guzzling for
gas-conscious Japanese drivers.
Automotive components met an identical fate. Japanese car companies tried
very hard to find U.S. made automotive components for their vehicles. They,
through their newly established purchasing offices in the U.S., encouraged many
leading automotive parts suppliers to respond to their potential demand for
competitive and quality parts. However, in the 1980s, most of the U.S.
automotive suppliers were not careful enough to understand the psychology of
Japanese car producers. Most of them simply believed that their parts, being used
by the Big Three, could be easily used on Japanese cars, too. They had no doubt
that their products could satisfy the demand of Japanese car producers in terms of
design, quality, price and so on, as long as they were meeting the expectations of
the Big Three in the U.S. They were somewhat blind to the fact that automotive
parts had to be individually designed to meet the specifications of each car
manufacturer. They did not realize that they were facing Japanese car companies,
not the Big Three. And, since the U.S. government had applied pressure to use
more U.S. made components, they took it for granted that their parts could be
accepted in Japan without any competition. They did not notice that their
products had to meet severe business competition from current and potential
suppliers in Japan, either.
In the meantime, U.S. car producers breathed a sigh of relief because of the
voluntary curb on Japanese car exports to the U.S. But, here, it seemed to me that
they made a fatal mistake. Using this time, they should have concentrated their
efforts to develop their own small cars to be able to meet the challenge of the
Japanese car companies. There was no question about it. They certainly had
both the technical capabilities and a skilled work force able produce competitive
small cars. However, the Big Three took a different approach. Instead of
developing good small cars to compete against Japanese cars, they shifted their
energy to the production of big gasoline engine trucks, which had no competition
from Japanese car producers at that time and provided a higher profit to them than
normal passenger cars. They might have been forced to show healthy profits on
their financial reports by their shareholders, who were believed to be more profit-
oriented than Japanese in general. In the meantime, the requirement for higher
U.S. content in the vehicles did not materialize. Though the unions and some
Congressmen demanded it, the idea did not receive wide-spread approval. This
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was due to a certain fact among the Big Three. In order to compete against
Japanese import cars, they had already started buying fairly extensively foreign
sourced materials and components, some even from Japan as was seen in the case
of the Aisan carburetor. For example, sheet metal for the car body, which
required special qualities to permit easy stamping and to reduce weight, had been
imported from Japanese steel mills. If the Big Three had acted as demanded, they
could not produce any cars in the U.S.
Japanese Transplants in the U.S.
In the late 1980s, after experiencing a continuous sharp increase of the
Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar, there arose strong opposition to Japanese car
exports from U.S. car producers and labor unions. There was a demand for
higher local content of U.S. parts and services as described above. Japanese car
manufacturers finally had to admit that they could not continue to export their
cars as before. Then they decided to start producing cars in the U.S. By
switching from export to local production, their headaches, such as the exchange
rate between the Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar and the trade imbalance could
be easily solved. But it was “Easier said than done”. What they had been doing
in the past was to produce cars in Japan with a Japanese labor force. They did not
have much experience in producing cars in countries outside Japan with a few
exceptions.
4
They were not confident that the same level of quality and
productivity could be maintained in the U.S. with U.S. workers. This concern,
however, soon turned to be an exaggeration. Anyway, local production of their
cars in the U.S. required not only a lot of investment in plant and manufacturing
equipment, but also for the workforce to understand the philosophy and
procedures of car production that were established in Japan. Plants, machines and
various manufacturing equipment were not difficult to prepare because the U.S.
was one of the most advanced industrial countries in the world. The big issue
was the workforce to produce cars. They were expected not only to perform the
given simple manufacturing job, but to carry out quality assurance and other
Kaizen, meaning improvement activities as well. Workers played far more
important roles in the Japanese car industry than machines. They were the keys
to higher quality, productivity, efficiency and profit. Because of this, most
Japanese car manufactures did not want workers strongly influenced by the UAW.
They were afraid that UAW workers were already influenced by the working
philosophies and ethics of the Big Three. They were not against the union
workers. They simply wanted to have open-minded workers who could
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Toyota, for example, had produced their cars in several countries up to this point such as
Brazil, Philippines and so on. But the production was quite limited and often they were only
slightly better than CKD (Complete Knock Down), which means the final assembling of cars
with all major components imported.
understand their working philosophies without prejudice. Thus, Japanese car
companies in the late 1980s started to build their transplants in the U.S. As said
above, they naturally located their transplants in the UAW-free states. Nissan
started its car manufacturing in Smyrna, Tennessee and Toyota at Georgetown,
Kentucky. Mitsubishi and Mazda started their transplants with UAW workers.
They located their plants in Bloomington/Normal, Illinois and Flat Rock,
Michigan. These places were selected because they had strong connections with
Chrysler and Ford respectively.
The start of car production in the U.S. by Toyota was a heavy blow to Aisan.
If car exports to the U.S. were switched to local production, it was quite obvious
that its business with Toyota in Japan would be severely damaged. U.S. exports
accounted for the highest percentage among Toyota’s overall exports. So if Aisan
lost its components business with Toyota for exports to the U.S., there was no
doubt that it would cause sales to plummet. Even though Toyota continued to
procure Aisan components for its needs in the U.S. plant, it was sure enough that
Toyota, sooner or later, would start procuring them from U.S. suppliers. Toyota
needed to do so in order to meet the demand for higher U.S. content in its cars
soon. There was not much time left. Aisan had to act quickly. Otherwise Toyota
might have selected U.S. suppliers for the components formerly procured from
Aisan.
Aisan’s First Overseas Manufacturing Operation
Confronted with this critical situation, Aisan organized a special project team,
including key staff from manufacturing engineering, quality assurance,
production, production control, accounting, sales and some other departments, to
evaluate the feasibility of its own U.S. production. Theoretically, it was to
objectively consider the issue with pros and cons. But it was actually carried out
to suit the pre-determined conclusion. This was for Aisan to go to the U.S. to
start producing components, which were then to be supplied to Toyota for their
U.S. production. There was no other conclusion. Aisan was quite desperate to
protect its business to survive. Therefore, almost all feasibility studies were
carried out to approve its U.S. transplant. This was around the year 1990.
Once it decided to start its own U.S. production, Aisan expected that the actual
execution would be carried out quite smoothly. But, it was not so because Aisan
did not have any experience in overseas production. So everything had to be
conducted slowly, groping for the right answer. Nobody knew the right answer.
Thus every member involved in the establishment of the transplant had to work
extremely hard for long hours. Aisan sent various teams to the U.S. several times
to select its plant site, design plant and manufacturing facilities, and most
importantly, talk to the local government and people. Even though this was the
first time for Aisan to produce its products overseas, it was firmly believed across
the company that the transplant was not viable without the approval, support and
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cooperation of the local government and its residents. Through these careful
preparations and studies, it finally selected Franklin, Kentucky. It was a small
farm town with the population of about 7,000 (seven thousand), located just north
of the Kentucky/Tennessee border.
When Japanese car companies decided to start manufacturing in the U.S., it
was widely rumored in the U.S. automotive industries that they would come along
with their Keiretsu (group) suppliers.
5
If Japanese car companies came to the
U.S. with their traditional Japanese parts suppliers, they would have been severely
criticized. The complaint was that Japan, instead of exporting cars, exported
automotive industries as a whole. Keiretsu (grouping) was criticized as one of the
malpractices peculiar to Japanese business society. It somehow reminded some
people of the Zaibatsu, which existed before WW II. In the Zaibatsu (great
industrial families), banks played a key role in controlling many industrial sectors
through their financially owned subsidiaries. Critics said that only the banks were
replaced with financially rich automotive car companies, such as Toyota. Toyota
knew very well about the position in which they were placed in the U.S. Toyota
therefore, in order to avoid to be criticized that it was coming to the U.S. with its
Keiretsu suppliers, advised all the suppliers to conduct their feasibility studies
very carefully. They repeatedly told them that they would not purchase
components made by transplants of Japanese suppliers simply because they were
the suppliers to Toyota back in Japan. They openly announced that they would
buy materials and components solely based on their merits, namely quality, cost
and delivery. Furthermore, they told their suppliers in Japan not to count on
business from Toyota in the U.S. in their feasibility studies. It rather encouraged
suppliers to be able to succeed in the U.S. without any business from Toyota. It
seemed quite reasonable, because Toyota itself was not sure then if their
transplant would be able to survive in the U.S. automobile market, which was
known to be one of the toughest in the world. Fortunately, because of these
premeditated considerations, Keiretsu did not become a big issue at all.
To Be Accepted among the Local Community
In the fall of 1991, Aisan started production at its transplant in the U.S. It was
named “Franklin Precision Industry, Inc. (hereinafter referred as FPI)” after the
city where it was located. This reflects its strong desire to become a good
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Normally the term Keiretsu is used for affiliated component suppliers in the Japanese
automotive industry. They are usually controlled by the car company in terms of equity,
business, personnel and sometimes their vital technology. These close ties between car
manufacturers and suppliers are often said to be one of the key strengths of Japanese car
manufacturers. In case of Aisan, one of the leading tier-1 suppliers to Toyota, more than 30
percent of its stock is held by Toyota. Its top management, namely the president, has been
regularly dispatched from Toyota for more than the last ten years.
corporate citizen of the community. The first product at FPI was a throttle body
for a fuel injection system. Though Aisan had been supplying its carburetors to
Ford, it did not consider the production of carburetors at FPI. It knew well that
the time of mechanical or even electronic carburetors had already passed. So it
was not hesitant to select throttle bodies for the production at FPI.
Since the beginning, FPI’ s main customer was the Toyota transplant in
Georgetown, KY. As publicly proclaimed, Toyota did not source throttle bodies
from FPI only because its parent company in Japan had been the supplier of the
same. They asked many other parts suppliers to quote supply terms for the
throttle body as well. FPI, through the cooperation of its parent company, Aisan
in Japan, knew the required specifications, quality level and expected price. It
secured the business from the Toyota transplant successfully.
FPI started as a quite small operation in the beginning. It was an operation
free from UAW constraints. Because it was the first overseas manufacturing
operation, both Aisan, the parent company and FPI, the subsidiary, were quite
prudent in almost everything. Aisan picked several key personnel to be
dispatched to FPI. It selected the very best employees from manufacturing
engineering, quality assurance, production, production control, tool and die
making, accounting and sales departments. It meant that those people were well
experienced in their respective departments and very much willing to work in the
U.S. Most of them were not fluent in English, however, they were brave enough
to communicate with U.S. employees by every conceivable means, such as
writing a drawing, showing actual products and equipment, demonstrating the
required operation by themselves and so on. FPI selected several core employees
for its manufacturing and quality assurance operations. Some had experience in
the automotive industries, others not at all. But they were willing to learn Aisan’s
actual operational methods and the ideas/philosophies behind it to produce good
automotive components. These core FPI employees were invited to Aisan prior to
its start of production in the U.S. for education and training. Each of them was
paired with a Japanese counterpart, who was in most cases already selected to be
sent to FPI. Aisan’s employees taught its way of production to FPI’s employees.
They, in turn, learned about how U.S. employees looked and acted in order to
carry out their expected duties. They had lunch together at Aisan’s canteen and
some of them even tried to take communal hot baths in a nearby hot spa. Thus,
they did their best to become a real team.
At FPI, various company rules and practices were established to make FPI a
true U.S. company and well-accepted by the people of Franklin, KY. First, all the
Japanese staff selected a nickname for themselves. Usually Japanese names are
not familiar to U.S. employees and are hard to pronounce. FPI’s first President,
Mr. M. YASUOKA, who used to be the director of sales at Aisan, Japan, ordered
all Japanese employees from Aisan to do so, he believed that daily
communication could be improved by calling each other by friendly nicknames.
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Vice President, Mr. TSUJIMOTO Kazuyuki, called himself Karl and accounting
manager, Mr. KASAMATSU Kenji was named “Ken”. Tool and die making
expert, Mr. IWASAKI, wanted to have a special name which would be instantly
recognized by the U.S. employees and be remembered easily. So he thought it
out and finally came up with the name, “Bud”, after the best-selling beer in the
U.S., Budweiser. But, to tell the truth, he was not able to drink at all. This was a
big success. I myself observed that his colleagues called out to him with a smile,
“Hi, Bud!” when he walked around the plant and office at FPI. Some of the rules
were very hard for Japanese staff. President, Mr. YASUOKA, designated English
as the official language of FPI, since FPI is an American company and asked all
the Japanese staff to speak English. If no U.S. employees were present, they were
allowed to speak Japanese. However, if more than one U.S. employee was
present, they were required to speak English. This was even true when they
spoke to their Japanese colleagues in meetings and in casual conversation. They
were also encouraged to actively engage in various social gatherings in the city of
Franklin. All the Japanese staff participated in these events with their wives.
Many wives demonstrated tea ceremonies and the Japanese “Bon (mid-summer
festival)” dance wearing kimonos on these occasions. The President, who liked
to play golf, made his own efforts to look and act similar to an ordinary U.S.
citizen. He drove a golf cart to visit a nearby country club on weekends to show
his neighbors that he was really enjoying life in Franklin.
U.S. Manufacturers with Japanese Capital
Through the 1990s and the 2000s, Toyota and some other Japanese car
manufacturers became quite successful automobile producers in the U.S. Now it
looks as if they are recognized as American automobile companies operating in
the U.S. with American employees and Japanese capital. The Toyota Camry
became the best-selling car many times in these years. Thanks to the wide
acceptance of their cars by the general public, their operations spread to other
states, such as Indiana, Alabama, Texas, and even to Canada. They are still
regarded as Japanese car manufacturers, but nobody in the U.S. regards them as
unfair competitors against the traditional Big Three car makers.
FPI also has become recognized as a U.S. automotive supplier. Though it had
added some emission control devices to its product line and grown several times
bigger than at the beginning, the basic concept implanted at the startup of the
company never faded away. It has been run as an automotive component supplier
based in the local community of Franklin, KY with Japanese capital. The ratio of
Japanese staff at FPI now accounts for less than 2 percent of the total workforce.
But, I am happy to say that you will have a difficulty distinguishing it from other
U.S. automotive suppliers.
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(3) The Devaluation of the U.S. Dollar against the Japanese Yen
while Facing the Threat from China
ASANO Sam（Tadao）
The following is a summary of a lecture presented at Nanzan University on
October 24
th
, 2012. These are highly opinionated views which reflect my
experiences as the CEO of a small Japanese subsidiary in California for 25 years.
Since the Nixon Shock, the positions of the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese yen
have been volatile. To improve relations, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), a major player, presented Japanese companies with initiatives. The
Japanese government responded by increasing holidays and reducing the number
of working hours of Japanese laborers. The management of corporations gave
yearly raises to workers and offered additional generous benefits, which were
unimaginable by Japanese standards.
The U.S. government and industries viewed the responses of Japanese
corporations as too little, too late. From the viewpoint of Japanese corporations,
the U.S. demands seemed to escalate like a geometric progression. The U.S.
wanted the Japanese to break out of their tired old routines, almost a revolutionary
action. The Japanese on the other hand see virtue in equanimity. As time
progressed, their responses became minimal. Neither side was able to see eye-to-
eye. Pathetically, in the end both camps recognized the situation as a “societal
conflict” and there was only loss to both parties.
Meanwhile, China briskly opened their bamboo curtain. Their labor costs
were at rock bottom. Their human resources were seemingly infinite. Coastal
provinces such as Guangdong or Fujian were literally sprawling with young
laborers eager to work.
U.S. retailers jumped on the chance to exploit Chinese labor. This nullified
the efforts made by Japanese corporations and made them absolutely meaningless.
Now, U.S. retailers’ long-standing mark-up traditions are facing a debacle. Many
trade industries are being declared moribund. The local mom-and-pop retailers
have become extinct, as mega-retailers have proliferated. Chinese products have
flooded into the U.S. market just as the conflict over the cheap Japanese yen
ebbed.
The U.S. seems to have contempt for the party in a runner-up position. It is
an American syndrome. For the time being, U.S. industries are enjoying having
China as their major supplier. However, sooner or later, the risk of having
relations with China will manifest itself. China will challenge the U.S. not only
in business, but militarily as well. This is the threat from China.
Regarding G&A, my advice is simple and stark. Don’t ever try to graft any
Japanese personnel traditions or office politics in the United States.
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My personal experiences from the past 43 years are ambivalent. I appreciate
all the employees and stake holders of the corporation. Yet, I must admit that I
was unable to establish real friendly relations with the American people. I do not
know why. Maybe my attitude towards Americans was not good enough. I was
too preoccupied and insular. My English capacity did not improve at all. Even
still, at a party with American people, I pretty much see myself as an alien. When
I speak to my grandson, my daughter always reminds me that I should speak
Japanese, not bad English. Otherwise, my grandson, Kaishu Charles Harrison,
might have his English influenced in a bad way. So, I always try to speak
Japanese to my grandson, but with a heavy Nagoya accent.
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